Details about Jordi Masso

Access statistics for papers by Jordi Masso.

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Short-id: pma318

Working Papers

2007

1. Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2008)
2. Matching Markets under (In)complete Information
   Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

2006

3. Weighted Approval Voting
   Research Memoranda, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization View citations
   Also in UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) (2006) View citations
   See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2008)

2003

4. Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
5. On Exiting after Voting
   Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona, Department of Economics, University of Girona
   See also Journal Article in International Journal of Game Theory (2006)
6. On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
   See also Journal Article in International Journal of Game Theory (2004)

2002

7. A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) View citations
8. Voting by Committees with Exit
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) View citations

2001

9. Voting by Committees under Constraints
   UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
   Also in Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society (2000)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2005)

1999

10. Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
    Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2003)

1996

11. Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1997)
12. Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
    Also in ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) (1996) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1998)

1992

13. Voting Under Constraints
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1997)

1991

14. Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
    See also Journal Article in International Journal of Game Theory (1996)

1990

15. MEMORY STARTEGIES IN NONATOMIC REPEATED GAMES
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Undated

16. AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
17. MAXIMAL DOMAIN OF PREFERENCES IN THE DIVISION PROBLEM
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2001)
18. THE CHI-COMPROMISE VALUE FOR NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES
    UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, 64, (2), 591-611
   See also Working Paper (2007)
2. On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 497-518
3. On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
   Economics Bulletin, 2008, 4, (21), 1-9
4. Weighted approval voting
   Economic Theory, 2008, 36, (1), 129-146
   See also Working Paper (2006)

2007

5. An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
   Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, 54, (2), 152-175 View citations
6. Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 61, (2), 331-343 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)
7. Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136, (1), 587-600 View citations
8. Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
   Review of Economic Design, 2007, 11, (3), 175-184 View citations

2006

9. On Exiting After Voting
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, 34, (1), 33-54 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2005

10. Voting by committees under constraints
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, 122, (2), 185-205
    See also Working Paper (2001)

2004

11. A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, 23, (2), 187-206
12. An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 47, (2), 187-210 View citations
13. On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, 33, (1), 115-128
    See also Working Paper (2003)
14. Stability and voting by committees with exit
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, 23, (2), 229-247 View citations

2003

15. Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 42, (1), 91-100 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)

2001

16. Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 37, (2), 367-387 View citations
    See also Working Paper

2000

17. Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 91, (1), 91-105 View citations

1999

18. Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, 16, (2), 321-336 View citations

1998

19. Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 25, (2), 272-291 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1997

20. Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 75, (2), 464-475 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)
21. Voting under Constraints
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 76, (2), 298-321 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1992)

1996

22. A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 15, (1), 55-81 View citations
23. Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games
    International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, 25, (4), 437-53
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1993

24. Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1993, 22, (3), 243-264 View citations

1989

25. More on the "anti-folk theorem"
    Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989, 18, (3), 281-290