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Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Patrick Schmitz

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights theory, there are no frictions ex post (i.e., after non-contractible investments have been sunk). In contrast, in transaction cost economics ex-post frictions play a central role. In this note, we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by allowing for ex-post moral hazard. As a consequence, central conclusions of the Grossman-Hart-Moore theory may be overturned. In particular, even though only party A has to make an investment decision, B-ownership can yield higher investment incentives. Moreover, ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship-specific (i.e., when they have no impact on the parties' disagreement payoffs).

Keywords: incomplete contracts; ownership rights; investment incentives; relationship specificity; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm (2019) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:97912

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