A Theory of Government Bailouts in a Heterogeneous Banking System

Ettore Panetti and Filomena Garcia

Working Papers from Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department

Abstract: How should a government bail out a heterogeneous banking system subject to systemic self-fulfilling runs? To answer this question, we develop a theory of banking with multiple groups of depositors of different size and wealth, where systemic self-fulfilling runs emerge as a consequence of a global game, and a government uses a public good to bailout banks through liquidity injections. In this framework, we characterize the endogenous probability of a systemic self-fulfilling run, and the conditions under which a full bailout cannot be part of the equilibrium. The optimal bailout strategy should target those banks whose bailout has the largest marginal impact on the probability of a systemic self-fulfilling run, and whose depositors are at the lower end of the wealth distribution.

JEL-codes: D81 G01 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ptu:wpaper:w201716

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