Teams and Individuals in Standard Auction Formats: Decisions and Emotions

Maria Karmeliuk and Martin Kocher
Additional contact information
Maria Karmeliuk: LMU Munich

No 279, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we claim that the observed difference can be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.

Keywords: auctions; team decision-making; experiment; overbidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Teams and individuals in standard auction formats: decisions and emotions (2022)
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