Cost Incentives in European Football

Arne Feddersen, Brad Humphreys and Brian Soebbing

No 2012-13, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the effects of financial incentives on effort supplied by football clubs in European domestic leagues. Tournament theory predicts that the amount of effort supplied varies with returns to effort. We analyze variation in 31,746 domestic league match outcomes in ten European leagues over eleven seasons, exploiting the actual standings on the league table to generate variables reflecting incentives to provide effort in each match. Results from ordered logit regressions indicate that the effort implied by observed match outcomes support the predictions of tournament theory in this setting; clubs supply more or less effort in response to changes in incentives.

Keywords: effort supply; football; UEFA Champions League (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J01 J33 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2012-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-hrm and nep-spo
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_013

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