Fairness That Money Can Buy. Procedural Egalitarianism in Practice
Werner Gueth (gueth@econ.mpg.de) and
Hartmut Kliemt
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Werner Gueth: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth (gueth@coll.mpg.de)
Rationality, Markets and Morals, 2013, vol. 4, issue 65
Abstract:
Contrary to communitarian market criticism institutions relying on money and bidding can strengthen faculties of ‘self-governance’. Securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations guarantees that all realized changes of a status quo are in an ‘objective’ (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. We show how to use this idea in the context of Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects. Empirical evidence on ‘procedurally fair bidding’ is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration but money may be the best means to express moral values in ‘communitarian consent’.
Keywords: Fair Procedures; Governing the Commons; Communitarianism; Contractarianism; Egalitarian Mechanisms; Unanimity; ‘Crowding out’ (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D63 D71 H4 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rmm:journl:v:4:y:2013:i:65
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