To AB or Not to AB? Dispute Settlement in WTO Reform

Bernard Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis

No 2020/34, RSCAS Working Papers from European University Institute

Abstract: Recent debates on the operation of the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism have focused primarily on the Appellate Body (AB). We argue that this neglects the first-order issue confronting the rules-based trading system: sustaining the principle of de-politicized dispute resolution that is reflected in the negative consensus rules for adoption of findings by trade dispute adjudicators. The existence of the AB is not material in this regard. Improving the quality of the panel process, complemented by reforms to WTO working practices that reduce incentives to resort to formal dispute settlement, can resolve the main issues that led to the AB crisis. An effective, coherent and consistent system of WTO dispute resolution need not include an AB.

Keywords: trade disputes; adjudication; Appellate Body; panels; WTO reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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