Sharing Risk Through Concession Contracts

Pasquale Scandizzo and Marco Ventura

No 166, CEIS Research Paper from Tor Vergata University, CEIS

Abstract: In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.

Keywords: (S) uncertainty modelling; real option; (B) transportation; (P) risk analysis; concession contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 L50 L91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2010-05-28, Revised 2010-05-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Journal Article: Sharing risk through concession contracts (2010)
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