On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions

Shurojit Chatterji, Remzi Sanver and Arunava Sen

No 07-2010, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate domains which admit "well-behaved", strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982). We provide sharper versions of the results above when tops-onlyness is replaced by tops-selectivity and the richness condition is weakened.

Keywords: Voting-rules; Strategy-proofness; Restricted Domains; Tops-Only domains. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-sea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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Journal Article: On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions (2013)
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