The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Ana Ania

Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 26, issue 3, 497-516

Abstract: In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Keywords: Aggregative games; Evolutionarily stable strategy; Price-taking behavior; Stochastic stability; Supermodularity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

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