Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium

Zhiwei Liu ()
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Zhiwei Liu: Capital University of Economics and Business

Economic Theory, 2016, vol. 62, issue 4, No 7, 813-837

Abstract: Abstract We study the implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium (MREE). When each agent’s interim information is only his private signal, we show that each non-revealing MREE is implementable. This is not true for a partially revealing MREE or a fully revealing MREE. However, if each agent learns both his private signal and the market price in the interim, then each partially revealing and fully revealing MREE is implementable.

Keywords: Maximin preferences; Maximin rational expectations equilibrium; Maximin equilibrium; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0932-5

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