The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno () and Benyamin Shitovitz
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Ezra Einy: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Benyamin Shitovitz: University of Haifa

Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 63, issue 4, No 4, 925-942

Abstract: Abstract Consider a symmetric common-value Tullock contest with incomplete information in which the players’ cost of effort is the product of a random variable and a deterministic real function of effort, d. We show that the Arrow–Pratt curvature of d, $$R_{d},$$ R d , determines the effect on equilibrium efforts and payoffs of the increased flexibility/reduced commitment that more information introduces into the contest: If $$R_{d}$$ R d is increasing, then effort decreases (increases) with the level of information when the cost of effort (value) is independent of the state of nature. Moreover, if $$R_{d}$$ R d is increasing (decreasing), then the value of public information is nonnegative (nonpositive).

Keywords: Tullock contests; Common values; Value of public information; C72; D44; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Value of Public Information in Common-Value Tullock Contests (2014)
Working Paper: The value of public information in common value Tullock contests (2014)
Working Paper: The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3

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