Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice

Qianfeng Tang () and Yongchao Zhang ()
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Yongchao Zhang: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 2, No 6, 533-552

Abstract: Abstract We study the trade-off between stability and students’ welfare in school choice problems. We call a matching weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching—one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. A matching is said to be self-constrained efficient if for students it is not Pareto dominated by any more stable matching, and it is self-constrained optimal if it weakly Pareto dominates all such matchings. We show that the following are equivalent for any matching: (1) It is weakly stable and self-constrained efficient; (2) it is self-constrained optimal; (3) it is an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) outcome under some consenting constraints; and (4) it is exactly the EADAM outcome when its own set of blocking pairs is used as consenting constraint.

Keywords: Deferred acceptance algorithm; Pareto efficiency; School choice; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01255-3

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