Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism

David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer ()
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Ehud Lehrer: Tel Aviv University

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 71, issue 2, No 4, 483-504

Abstract: Abstract We design incentive schemes for portfolio managers that screen low-skill managers: only the best portfolio managers, in terms of expected payoffs, agree to participate in a single-period investment. The results hold in general financial markets, where uninformed investors face managers of different capabilities, and can only observe their one-stage realized returns.

Keywords: Screening problem; Reward schemes; Investment game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G11 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Transferable Deposits as a Screening Mechanism (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01264-2

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