EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Ju Hu () and Xi Weng
Additional contact information
Ju Hu: Peking University

Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 72, issue 3, No 10, 909-953

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies robust Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in a binary environment, where an ambiguity-averse sender with a maxmin expected utility function has limited knowledge about the receiver’s private information source. We develop a novel method to solve the sender’s information design problem. Our main result shows that the sender’s optimal information structure can be found within the class of linear-contingent-payoff information structures. We also fully characterize the sender’s optimal linear-contingent-payoff information structure and analyze the impact of ambiguity on the sender’s payoff.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; Ambiguity aversion; Maxmin utility; Private information; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01299-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01299-5

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-24
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:72:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01299-5