Unbeatable strategies

Rabah Amir (), Igor V. Evstigneev () and Valeriya Potapova ()
Additional contact information
Rabah Amir: University of Iowa
Igor V. Evstigneev: University of Manchester
Valeriya Potapova: Validus Risk Management

Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 77, issue 4, No 1, 920 pages

Abstract: Abstract The paper analyzes the notion of an unbeatable strategy as a game-theoretic solution concept. A general framework (games with relative preferences) suitable for the analysis of this concept is proposed. Basic properties of unbeatable strategies are presented and a number of examples and applications considered.

Keywords: Unbeatable strategies; Relative preferences; Zero-sum games; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01521-0

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