The selectope for cooperative games

Jean Derks, Hans Haller () and Hans Peters
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Hans Haller: Department of Mathematics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA Department of Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 23-38

Abstract: The selectope of a cooperative transferable utility game is the convex hull of the payoff vectors obtained by assigning the Harsanyi dividends of the coalitions to members determined by so-called selectors. The selectope is studied from a set-theoretic point of view, as superset of the core and of the Weber set; and from a value-theoretic point of view, as containing weighted Shapley values, random order values, and sharing values.

Keywords: Cooperative game; selectope core; Weber set; sharing value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received May 1997/Revised version September 1999
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