Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money

Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto () and Shohei Tamura

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 1, 195-207

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating a single indivisible good among $$n$$ n agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanisms. We show that there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism (under the weak domain condition that the set of agent’s possible valuations includes at least $$n+1$$ n + 1 common valuations). Moreover, this result implies that there is no strategy-proof, symmetric, and budget balanced mechanism (i) in the model where agents may have non-quasilinear preferences, and/or (ii) in the unit-demand model with $$n$$ n heterogeneous indivisible goods. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Symmetry; Budget balance; Indivisible good; Monetary transfer; C72; D63; D71; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0425-y

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