Pillage games with multiple stable sets

Simon MacKenzie, Manfred Kerber and Colin Rowat

International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 4, 993-1013

Abstract: We prove that pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131.1:26–44, 2006 , “Pillage and property”, JET) can have multiple stable sets, constructing pillage games with up to $$2^{\tfrac{n-1}{3}}$$ 2 n - 1 3 stable sets, when the number of agents, $$n$$ n , exceeds four. We do so by violating the anonymity axiom common to the existing literature to establish a power dichotomy: for all but a small exceptional set of endowments, powerful agents can overcome all the others; within the exceptional set, the lesser agents can defend their resources. Once the allocations giving powerful agents all resources are included in a candidate stable set, deriving the rest proceeds by considering dominance relations over the finite exceptional sets—reminiscent of stable sets’ derivation in classical cooperative game theory. We also construct a multi-good pillage game with only three agents that also has two stable sets. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Keywords: Pillage games; Cooperative game theory; Core; Stable sets; C63; C71; P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Pillage Games with Multiple Stable Sets (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0462-1

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