Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids

Patrick Hummel (), Randolph McAfee and Sergei Vassilvitskii
Additional contact information
Patrick Hummel: Google Inc.
Sergei Vassilvitskii: Google Inc.

International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, vol. 45, issue 4, No 12, 1052 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper illustrates a method for making side payments to advertiser networks that creates an incentive for the advertiser networks to submit the second-highest bids they received to an ad exchange and simultaneously ensures that the publishers will make more money on average in the short run as a result of adopting this scheme. We also illustrate how this payment scheme affects publisher payoffs in the long run after advertisers have a chance to modify their strategies in response to the changed incentives of the mechanism.

Keywords: Advertiser networks; Advertising exchanges; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0501-y

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