Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and
Juan Vidal-Puga
International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 1, No 8, 173-193
Abstract:
Abstract We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity.
Keywords: Land rental; Non-manipulability; Reassignment-proofness; Land monotonicity; Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems (2018) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00684-2
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00684-2
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