Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato (), Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien () and Simone Tonin
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Francesca Busetto: Università degli Studi di Udine
Giulio Codognato: Università degli Studi di Udine
Simone Tonin: Università degli Studi di Udine

International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, vol. 49, issue 4, No 2, 933-951

Abstract: Abstract We consider a bilateral oligopoly version of the Shapley window model with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. For this model, we provide a general existence proof of a Cournot–Nash equilibrium that allows one of the two commodities to be held only by atoms. Then, we show, using a corollary proved by Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), that a Cournot–Nash allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if it is a Walras allocation.

Keywords: Bilateral oligopoly; Cournot–Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part (2020)
Working Paper: Existence and Optimality of Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Bilateral Oligopoly with Atoms and an Atomless Part (2018)
Working Paper: Existence and Optimality of Cournot-Nash Equilibria in a Bilateral Oligopoly with Atoms and an Atomless Part (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00719-z

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