Equilibria in bottleneck games
Ryo Kawasaki (kawasaki.r.aa@m.titech.ac.jp),
Hideo Konishi and
Junki Yukawa
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Ryo Kawasaki: Tokyo Institute of Technology
Junki Yukawa: Tokyo Institute of Technology
International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 3, No 2, 649-685
Abstract:
Abstract This paper introduces a bottleneck game with finite sets of commuters and departing time slots as an extension of congestion games of Konishi et al. (J Econ Theory 72:225–237, 1997a). After characterizing Nash equilibrium of the game, we provide sufficient conditions for which the equivalence between Nash and strong equilibria holds. Somewhat surprisingly, unlike in congestion games, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may often fail to exist, even when players are homogeneous. In contrast, when there is a continuum of atomless players, the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the equivalence between the set of Nash and strong equilibria hold as in congestion games (Konishi et al. 1997a).
Keywords: Bottleneck game; Nash equilibrium; Strong equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00834-z
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