EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Equilibria in bottleneck games

Ryo Kawasaki (kawasaki.r.aa@m.titech.ac.jp), Hideo Konishi and Junki Yukawa
Additional contact information
Ryo Kawasaki: Tokyo Institute of Technology
Junki Yukawa: Tokyo Institute of Technology

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 3, No 2, 649-685

Abstract: Abstract This paper introduces a bottleneck game with finite sets of commuters and departing time slots as an extension of congestion games of Konishi et al. (J Econ Theory 72:225–237, 1997a). After characterizing Nash equilibrium of the game, we provide sufficient conditions for which the equivalence between Nash and strong equilibria holds. Somewhat surprisingly, unlike in congestion games, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may often fail to exist, even when players are homogeneous. In contrast, when there is a continuum of atomless players, the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the equivalence between the set of Nash and strong equilibria hold as in congestion games (Konishi et al. 1997a).

Keywords: Bottleneck game; Nash equilibrium; Strong equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-022-00834-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibria in Bottleneck Games (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00834-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00834-z

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla (sonal.shukla@springer.com) and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (indexing@springernature.com).

 
Page updated 2024-12-29
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:52:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-022-00834-z