On the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium in (k + 1)-st price common value auctions

Ilia Tsetlin () and Aleksandar Pekeč ()

Review of Economic Design, 2006, vol. 10, issue 1, 63-71

Keywords: Auctions; Symmetric equilibrium; Common value; Auction theory; D44; C62; C72; D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-006-0005-0

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