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Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders

Alexey Malakhov (malakhov@walton.uark.edu) and Rakesh Vohra (r-vohra@kellogg.northwestern.edu)

Review of Economic Design, 2008, vol. 12, issue 4, 245-257

Keywords: Dominant strategy; Shortest path; Network; C61; C70; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0051-x

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