Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program

Jinyong Jeong ()
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Jinyong Jeong: Liaoning University

Review of Economic Design, 2021, vol. 25, issue 3, No 2, 139-156

Abstract: Abstract I model a teacher transfer program in South Korea as a matching-with-contracts problem. The current (non-centralized) system allows a teacher wishing to make an inter-state transfer to submit, at most, one application and will approve only a one-to-one exchange. Consequently, not only is this current system unstable and inefficient, but it also does not adequately reflect the teachers’ preferences. In contrast, the centralized mechanism I propose fully represents teachers’ preferences and is less wasteful. One key requirement of a teacher transfer program is that it must protect the rights of currently existing teachers who wish to transfer from their current positions, perhaps to satisfy familial needs, for only a short period of time. However, as I demonstrate, no stable mechanism exists that guarantee protection for the rights of such teachers to the positions they currently occupy. To solve this problem, I introduce a novel concept called a claim contract. A claim contract, in a matching-with-contracts model, protects current teachers by removing contracts that do not match the specified duration set by these teachers from the set of potential matches. In this paper, I propose a new mechanism, based on a claim contract, that is strategy-proof and approximates stable matching.

Keywords: Matching with property rights; Matching with contract; Claim contract; Teacher assignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00245-8

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