Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem

Rasoul Ramezanian () and Mehdi Feizi
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Rasoul Ramezanian: Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

Review of Economic Design, 2021, vol. 25, issue 3, No 3, 157-176

Abstract: Abstract We introduce two notions of ex-post fairness, namely ex-post favoring ranks (EFR) and robust ex-post favoring ranks, which consider whether objects are received by those agents who have the highest rank for them. We examine their compatibility with standard properties of random assignments and state some impossibility theorems. We also propose and formalize a revised version of the Boston mechanism and prove that it provides an EFR random assignment.

Keywords: Random assignment problem; Favoring higher ranks; Interim favoring ranks; Ex-post favoring ranks; Robust ex-post favoring ranks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7

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