Two-agent interactive implementation

Shuichi Tsugawa ()
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Shuichi Tsugawa: Okinawa University

Review of Economic Design, 2021, vol. 25, issue 4, No 2, 266 pages

Abstract: Abstract This study investigates the implementation of social choice rules (SCRs) in a situation where a planner not only designs the mechanism, but also participates as a player. This type of implementation is called interactive implementation. Using the same setting as Baliga and Sjöström (Games Econ Behav 27(1):38–63, 1999) with the exception of the number of agents, I characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for two-agent interactive implementation, and find a necessary and sufficient condition, which we term intersection property. Even though our example shows the benefits of two-agent interactive implementation, that is, interactive implementation makes it possible to implement a non Maskin monotonic SCR, we find that it is not possible to implement a utilitarian planner’s optimum in a two-agent exchange economy and to resolve King Solomon’s dilemma.

JEL-codes: C72 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00247-6

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