Optimal mechanism for land acquisition

Soumendu Sarkar

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 1, No 5, 87-116

Abstract: Abstract Sellers with one unit of land each are located at the nodes of a graph. Two sellers are contiguous if they are connected by an edge in the graph. The buyer realizes a positive value only if he can purchase plots that constitute a path of given length. We characterize the optimal mechanism when the buyer and sellers have independently distributed private valuations.

Keywords: Contiguity; Convergence; Eminent Domain; Land acquisition; Mechanism design; Optimal mechanism; Myerson-Satterthwaite (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00256-5

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