Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts

Yusuke Iwase ()

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 1, No 6, 117-125

Abstract: Abstract This study considers the doctor-optimal stable mechanism in a matching-with-contract model (a doctor-hospital match, for instance). We show that, whenever the doctor-optimal stable mechanism exists, the mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if it is efficient if and only if it is Maskin monotonic, all from the doctors’ side. Moreover, with substitutes and the law of aggregate demand, we find that the mechanism is consistent if and only if it is efficient.

Keywords: Matching with contracts; Doctor-optimal stable mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D47 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00257-4

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