Stability of an allocation of objects

Murat Yılmaz () and Özgür Yılmaz ()
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Murat Yılmaz: Boğaziçi University
Özgür Yılmaz: Koç University

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 4, No 4, 580 pages

Abstract: Abstract A central stability notion for allocation problems when there are private endowments is core: no coalition should be able to block the allocation. But, for an exchange economy of discrete resources, core can be empty. An alternative stability axiom is the bargaining set à la Aumann and Maschler (Advances in game theory, Annals of mathematics studies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 443–476, 1964): a blocking by a coalition is justified only if there is no counter-objection to it and an allocation is in the bargaining set if there does not exist a justified blocking. Allowing for weak preferences, we prove that any allocation obtained by the well-known Top Trading Cycles class is in the bargaining set, but not all allocations in the bargaining set can be obtained by this class.

Keywords: Assignment problem; Core; Bargaining set; Top trading cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00280-5

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