A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms

Duygu Nizamogullari () and İpek Özkal-Sanver ()
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Duygu Nizamogullari: Piri Reis University
İpek Özkal-Sanver: İstanbul Bilgi University

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 4, No 3, 553-560

Abstract: Abstract Classical roommate problems define individual rationality by conceiving remaining single as the “outside option”. This conception implicitly assumes that there are always some empty rooms to be shared. However, there are many instances when this is not the case. We introduce roommate problems with a limited number of rooms, where the “outside option” is “having no room”. In this general framework, we show that the core equals the set of Pareto optimal and stable matchings.

Keywords: Individual rationality; Pareto optimality; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00297-4

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