On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

William Thomson ()
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William Thomson: University of Rochester

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 4, No 1, 542 pages

Abstract: Abstract This is a survey of the literature of (approximately) the last 10 years on the axiomatic approach to conflict resolution formulated by Nash (Econometrica 28:155–162, 1950). It updates two previous surveys (Thomson, in: Aumann, Hart (eds) Handbook of game theory, North-Holland, 1994, in: Thomson (ed) Bargaining and the theory of cooperative games: John Nash and beyond, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Camberly, Northampton, 2010).

Keywords: Axiomatic theory of bargaining; Nash solution; Kalai–Smorodinsky solution; Egalitarian solution; Raiffa solution; Independence axiom; Monotonicity axiom; Consistency; Population Monotonicity; C71-72-78; D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00319-1

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