Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game

Trivikram Dokka (), Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray () and Sonali SenGupta ()
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Trivikram Dokka: Queen’s University Belfast
Sonali SenGupta: Queen’s University Belfast

Review of Economic Design, 2023, vol. 27, issue 2, No 7, 419-438

Abstract: Abstract As in public good provisions, in a public bad situation such as abatement, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of quantities (provision or abatement). In a simple class of n-person quadratic games, we show how Coarse correlated equilibria, using simple mediation devices, can significantly outperform Nash equilibrium outcomes in terms of a stated policy objective.

Keywords: Quadratic game; Coarse correlated equilibrium; Abatement level; Efficiency gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00299-2

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