The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization

Yajing Chen (), Patrick Harless () and Zhenhua Jiao ()
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Yajing Chen: East China University of Science and Technology
Patrick Harless: University of Arizona
Zhenhua Jiao: Shanghai University of International Business and Economics

Review of Economic Design, 2024, vol. 28, issue 1, No 2, 43 pages

Abstract: Abstract This study considers the problem of random assignment of a set of objects to a set of agents based on strict ordinal preferences of the agents. We analyze the fractional Boston rule, which is a generalization of the classical Boston rule to random assignment environments. We introduce two new axioms—stochastic dominance (sd)-rank-efficiency and equal-rank envy-freeness—which are respectively efficiency and fairness conditions that respect preference ranks. Sd-rank-efficiency implies ordinal efficiency, which is an efficiency concept defined by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (J Econ Theory 100(2):295–328, 2001) for random assignment environments in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Equal-rank envy-freeness implies equal treatment of equals. Sd-rank-efficiency and equal-rank envy-freeness characterize the fractional Boston rule.

Keywords: Random assignment; Fractional Boston rule; Sd-rank-efficiency; Equal-rank envy-freeness; Axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7

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