original papers: Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?

Ken Binmore () and Joe Swierzbinski ()
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Ken Binmore: Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK
Joe Swierzbinski: Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK

Review of Economic Design, 2000, vol. 5, issue 4, 387-410

Abstract: There has been much discussion of the relative merits of selling government bonds using a uniform-price auction rather than the traditional discriminatory-price auction. Arguments in favor of the former have won the day in respect of the newly instituted auctions of index-linked bonds in the USA and UK. This short paper assesses the evidence and concludes that the advantages of uniform-price auctions have been oversold.

Keywords: Auctions; government bond markets; uniform-price auctions; discriminatory-price auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 G18 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-01
Note: Received: 28 May 1999 / Accepted: 27 September 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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