original papers: On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

Ahmet Alkan ()

Review of Economic Design, 2001, vol. 6, issue 1, 99-111

Abstract: This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties.

Keywords: Stable matchings; revealed preference; choice function; lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-17
Note: Received: 5 March 1999 / Accepted: 12 May 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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