The effects of rejecting aid on recipients’ reputations: Evidence from natural disaster responses

Allison Carnegie () and Lindsay R. Dolan ()
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Allison Carnegie: Columbia University
Lindsay R. Dolan: Wesleyan University

The Review of International Organizations, 2021, vol. 16, issue 3, No 2, 495-519

Abstract: Abstract How do states improve their international status and prestige short of war? We argue that rejecting international assistance can boost a government’s image by making it appear self-sufficient and able to provide for its citizens, leading many states to decline foreign aid. However, potential recipients only do so when they have the ability to send a credible signal and when they value status highly. We derive these hypotheses from a formal model and then use a survey experiment to demonstrate that international observers alter their opinions about potential recipients when they learn that they rejected international aid. Finally, we gather new data to empirically verify that the more resources and greater military capabilities states possess, the more likely they are to reject aid, even when they require the aid. Our results help to explain why states refuse needed assistance and suggest that many states cultivate images of self-sufficiency.

Keywords: Foreign aid; Natural disasters; Signaling; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11558-020-09393-y

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