Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria

, () and , B. ()
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,: University of Iowa
, B.: Stanford University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Srihari Govindan and Robert Butler Wilson ()

Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 1, issue 2, 167-206

Abstract: A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subset that is stable in the sense defined by Kohlberg and Mertens. One assumption requires that a selected set is invariant to adjoining redundant strategies and the other is a strong version of backward induction. Backward induction is interpreted as the requirement that each player's strategy is sequentially rational and conditionally admissible at every information set in an extensive-form game with perfect recall, implemented here by requiring that the equilibrium is quasi-perfect. The strong version requires 'truly' quasi-perfection in that each strategy perturbation refines the selection to a quasi-perfect equilibrium in the set. An exact characterization of stable sets is provided for two-player games.

Keywords: Game theory; equilibrium selection; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria (2006)
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