Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Arjada Bardhi () and Yingni Guo ()
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Arjada Bardhi: Department of Economics, Northwestern University
Yingni Guo: Department of Economics, Northwestern University

Theoretical Economics, 2018, vol. 13, issue 3

Abstract: A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Under individual persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends only on her state. The sender designates a subgroup of rubber-stampers, another of fully informed voters, and a third of partially informed voters. The most demanding voters are strategically accorded high-quality information.

Keywords: Information design; collective decision-making; unanimity rule; information guard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 D83 G28 K20 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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