Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information

Wei He () and Yeneng Sun ()
Additional contact information
Wei He: Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Yeneng Sun: Risk Management Institute and Department of Economics, National University of Singapore

Theoretical Economics, 2020, vol. 15, issue 2

Abstract: This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect-information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria as well as the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs, extending the earlier results on perfect-information deterministic dynamic games.

Keywords: Dynamic games; perfect information; almost perfect information; subgame-perfect equilibrium; atomless transition; atomless reference measure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20200811/27030/787 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:2927

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Simon Board, Todd D. Sarver, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra, Pierre-Olivier Weill

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().