Sequential persuasion

Fei Li () and Peter Norman ()
Additional contact information
Fei Li: Department of Economics, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
Peter Norman: Department of Economics, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill

Theoretical Economics, 2021, vol. 16, issue 2

Abstract: This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium, and results in a more informative equilibrium in the case of two states. Moreover, with the exception of the first sender, it is without loss of generality to let each sender move only once. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; communication; competition in persuasion; multiple senders; sequential persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05-03
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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