On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks

Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian and Giuseppe Freni

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: This study examines the dynamics of the exploitation of a natural resource distributed among and flowing between several nodes connected via a weighted, directed network. The network represents the locations and interactions of the resource nodes. A regulator decides to designate some of the nodes as natural reserves where no exploitation is allowed. The remaining nodes are assigned (one-to-one) to players, who exploit the resource at the node. It is demonstrated how the equilibrium exploitation and resource stocks depend on the productivity of the resource sites, the structure of the connections between the sites, and the number and preferences of the agents. The best locations to host nature reserves are identified per the model's parameters and correspond to the most central (in the sense of eigenvector centrality) nodes of a suitably redefined network that considers the nodes' productivity.

Keywords: Harvesting; spatial models; differential games; nature reserves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q20 Q28 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks (2024)
Working Paper: On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks (2024)
Working Paper: On Competition For Spatially Distributed Resources On Networks (2020)
Working Paper: On Competition for Spatially Distributed Resources in Networks (2020)
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