Symmetric reduced form voting

Xu Lang () and Debasis Mishra ()
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Xu Lang: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Debasis Mishra: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: We study a model of voting with two alternatives in a symmetric environment. We characterize the interim allocation probabilities that can be implemented by a symmetric voting rule. We show that every such interim allocation probabilities can be implemented as a convex combination of two families of deterministic voting rules: qualified majority and qualified anti-majority. We also provide analogous results by requiring implementation by a unanimous voting rule. A consequence of our results is that if the prior is independent, every symmetric and ordinally Bayesian incen- tive compatible voting rule is reduced (interim) form equivalent to a symmetric and strategy-proof voting rule.

Keywords: Reduced form voting; unanimous voting; ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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