Optimal sequential contests

Toomas Hinnosaar

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 1

Abstract: I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has many applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of the commons. I show that information about other players' efforts increases the total effort. Thus, the total effort is maximized with full transparency and minimized with no transparency. I also show that in addition to the first-mover advantage, there is an earlier-mover advantage. Finally, I derive the limits for large contests and discuss the limit to perfectly competitive outcomes under different disclosure rules.

Keywords: Contest design; oligopoly; public goods; rent-seeking; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-01-26
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Sequential Contests (2021)
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