Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring:Experiments and Theory

Yutaka Kayaba, Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama
Additional contact information
Yutaka Kayaba: Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
Tomohisa Toyama: Division of Liberal Arts, Kogakuin University

No CIRJE-F-1004, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We experimentally examine repeated prisoners' dilemma with random termination, where monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of subjects follow generous Tit-For-Tat (g-TFT) strategies, straightforward extensions of Tit-For-Tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the g-TFT equilibria. Contrarily to the theory, subjects tend to retaliate more with high accuracy than with low accuracy. They tend to retaliate more than the theory predicts with high accuracy, while they tend to retaliate lesser with low accuracy. In order to describe these results as unique equilibrium, we demonstrate an alternative theory that incorporates naïveté and reciprocity.

Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2016/2016cf1004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (2016)
Working Paper: Accuracy and Retaliation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Experiments and Theory (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2016cf1004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CIRJE administrative office ().