Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy

Hitoshi Matsushima

No CIRJE-F-1115, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner's dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that, in this setting, a player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by reciprocity. Players often become naive and select an action unconsciously. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a Nash equilibrium with behavioral incentives, termed behavioral equilibrium, in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, this study argues that reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to consciously make decisions.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2019cf1115

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