Recurrent Preemption Games

Hitoshi Matsushima

No 110, DSSR Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University

Abstract: I consider a new model of an infinitely repeated preemption game with random matching, termed the recurrent preemption game, wherein each player's discount factor depends on whether she wins the current game. This model describes sequential strategic technology adoptions in which a company becomes outdated by failing to maintain a position at the forefront of innovation. Assuming incomplete information about the presence of a rival, I clarify how the prominence of the innovator's dilemma influences the degree of excessive competition in preemption. I also reveal interesting properties demonstrated by the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the recurrent preemption game.

Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2020-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://hdl.handle.net/10097/00127369

Related works:
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020)
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020)
Working Paper: Recurrent Preemption Games (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:toh:dssraa:110

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