Are Teachers' Unions Really to Blame? Collective Bargaining Agreements and Their Relationships with District Resource Allocation and Student Performance in California

Katharine O. Strunk ()
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Katharine O. Strunk: Rossier School of Education, University of Southern California, Los Angeles

Education Finance and Policy, 2011, vol. 6, issue 3, 354-398

Abstract: Increased spending and decreased student performance have been attributed in part to teachers' unions and to the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) they negotiate with school boards. However, only recently have researchers begun to examine impacts of specific aspects of CBAs on student and district outcomes. This article uses a unique measure of contract restrictiveness generated through the use of a partial independence item response model to examine the relationships between CBA strength and district spending on multiple areas and district-level student performance in California. I find that districts with more restrictive contracts have higher spending overall, but that this spending appears not to be driven by greater compensation for teachers but by greater expenditures on administrators' compensation and instruction-related spending. Although districts with stronger CBAs spend more overall and on these categories, they spend less on books and supplies and on school board–related expenditures. In addition, I find that contract restrictiveness is associated with lower average student performance, although not with decreased achievement growth. © 2011 Association for Education Finance and Policy

Keywords: teachers' unions; collective bargaining agreements; school district spending; district resource allocation; student performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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