Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

Petra Nieken and Patrick Schmitz

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory.

Keywords: Repeated moral hazard; Sequential hidden actions; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (68)

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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13182/1/372.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (2012)
Working Paper: Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trf:wpaper:372

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